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Welfare Reform in the States: Does the Percentage of Female Legislators in State Legislatures
Affect Welfare Reform Policies?
LEE W. PAYNE

Ste phen F. Austin State University
Department of Government

My research tests the proposal that female legislators have issuespecific political agendas and that female representation may
affect these issues. Welfare is an issue that affects women and
children to a larger degree than it does men. To test this hypothesis I use three measures of welfare sanctions and one measure
of overall welfare environment as dependent variables. Results
indicate that the level of female legislators does not have the expected impact on two of the three sanction policies, but it does
have the expected impact on the overall welfare environment.

There is much debate surrounding the issue of women and
politics. This debate has lead to several pertinent questions concerning gender and policy. Do women legislators have different political agendas from their male counterparts (Wolbrecht,
2002)? Are there issues that are specifically "female" in nature;
such as, welfare reform, health care, child care, abortion, etc.
(Carroll, 2002)? Does female representation have a descriptive
or substantive effect on the political process (Bratton & Ray,
2002; Carroll, 2002)? Do female legislators view policy issues
differently from male legislators (Kathlene, 1995)? Do elected
female officials affect policy outcomes (Swers, 2002)? While all
of these questions address important research concerns, the
last question is the focus of my research.
My research tests the proposal that female legislators have
issue-specific political agendas that differ somewhat from
those of their male counterparts. This is not to say that male
legislators do not agree with female legislators on particular
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issues and vice-versa; party identification, constituent concerns, etc. can and do influence elected officials' issue stances.
However, female legislators may bring different perspectives
and concerns to certain issues. For instance, welfare is an issue
that affects women and children to a larger degree than it does
men. As such, welfare reform, which encompasses issues like
health care and child care for low-income women and children, may be of particular interest to female legislators.
If the premise that female legislators have specific political
agendas that differ somewhat from those of their male counterparts is accepted, a logical question follows: Do female legislators affect legislative outcomes? Specifically, does the proportion of female legislators in state legislatures affect welfare
policies?
Welfare Reform
In 1996 the Republican Congress passed, and President
Clinton signed into law, the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA). PRWORA ended
the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program
and replaced it with Temporary Assistance for Needy Families
(TANF). Two major, and controversial, components of TANF
that distinguish it from the previous AFDC program are: first,
recipients were life limited to 60 cumulative months of receiving benefits and, second, work requirements for continued assistance were established. Single parents must work at least 20
hours per week the first year, increasing to at least 30 hours per
week by fiscal year 2000. Two-parent families must work 35
hours per week by July 1, 1997. Further, TANF granted states
the autonomy to "experiment" with welfare reform by allowing states the option of instituting additional, even harsher,
sanctions on welfare recipients.
Examples of options available to states under TANF are: reducing the lifetime limit of 60 months' assistance that welfare
recipients can collect benefits to fewer months, shortening the
work requirement time limit, and instituting "family caps" on
recipients which place limits on the number of additional children for which recipients can receive additional benefits.In addition to the new and creative sanctions introduced in TANF, it
provides for performance bonuses to states that are successful
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in reducing welfare rolls by moving welfare recipients from
welfare and into the workforce. This provision worried many
that there would be a "race to the bottom" of benefits offered
among states, the theory being that welfare recipients would
leave states with harsher sanctions and take up residency
in states with milder sanctions, which, in turn, would cause
these states to adopt harsher sanctions in an attempt to reduce
welfare rolls and further migration. Research on whether
welfare recipients actually migrate to "easier" states is mixed
(Berry, Fording, & Hanson, 2003; Peterson & Rom, 1989),
but the concept exists and may influence decisions made on
welfare reform by state legislatures. For example, Vartanian,
Soss, Schram, and Baumohl (1999) find marginal support for
male welfare recipients moving to obtain better welfare benefits. They conclude that factors other than welfare benefits
impact where people choose to live. In addition, individuals
dependent upon welfare do not have funds needed for frequent moves.
Whether states adopt sanctions on welfare recipients is the
focus of my paper-specifically whether states adopt work requirement sanctions, family cap sanctions, and lifetime TANF
limits of less than 60 months. The overall state welfare "environment" will be analyzed as well. Research on TANF welfare
reform points to several factors that may influence state decisions on welfare sanction policies. These include: legislature
party makeup; state poverty rates; state total taxable resources
(TTR); state per-capita income; state unemployment rate; and
percent state minority populations, to name a few. Of interest
here is how and if the percentage of female legislators in a state
legislature influences welfare sanction policy. My research hypothesis is: as the percentage of female legislators in a state
legislature increases, the state legislature will be less likely to
adopt sanction policies on welfare recipients and more likely
to create a "friendlier" welfare environment.
Data and Methods
Four dependent variables have been operationalized
for analyses. These dependent variables represent specific
policy outcomes (welfare policy was adopted) and measures
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of overall policy environments (type of welfare environment
created by adopted policies).
The first three dependent variables were identified by Soss,
Schram, Vartanian, and O'Brien (2001) as indicators of "tough"
welfare sanctions; these are dichotomous variables that will
be used in logit regressions. Logit regressions allow for an
analysis of how each of the independent variables affects the
probability of an event occurring, in this case, the probability of sanction policies being adopted. The first dependent
variable scored states depending on whether they adopted
harsher work time limit policies than required by TANF. The
"Work Time Limit" variable was coded zero if the state allows
a maximum of 24 months before an able-bodied recipient must
find employment and one if the work time limit is shorter.
The second dependent variable scored states depending
on whether they adopted a family cap policy. States adopting a family cap provide either no increase in TANF benefits
or reduced benefits to women who have additional children
while on welfare. The "Family Cap" variable was coded zero if
the state did not adopt a family cap and one if it did.
The third dependent variable scored states depending on
whether they adopted harsher lifetime limit policies than required by TANF. The "Lifetime Limit" variable was coded zero
if the limit is 60 months and one if it is less than 60 months. In
these three dummy variables, zeros represent national TANF
standards and ones represent harsher, state-imposed sanctions. Therefore, positive coefficients in the logit regressions
represent increased probability of sanction adoption.
The final dependent variable represents welfare environments created by overall policy adoption. This variable is
ordinal in nature. As such, ordinal logit regressions will be
utilized in the subsequent analysis. This variable, "Welfare
Reform Score," was developed by Meyers, Gornick, and Peck
(2002) and is based on their analysis of cash assistance, food
assistance, disability assistance, tax policy, and unemployment
compensation in each state. They identified states in terms of
adequacy: the generosity of benefits received by welfare recipients; inclusion: the extent to which benefits reach those in need;
and state policy commitment: a measure that includes policy
choices that shape the availability, accessibility, extensiveness,
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or quality of family assistance programs. States were then
grouped into one of five categories-minimal, limited, conservative, generous, and integrated-depending on their performance on the above mentioned issues (Meyers et al., 2002).
States are coded from a low of one (minimal) to a high of five
(integrated). Given this coding, states that rank higher on this
variable are considered more progressive on welfare policy.
Summary statistics for dependent variables are provided in
Table 1.
Table 1: Summary Statistics (N = 50)
Mean Std. Dev.
Dependent Variables
0.50
0.48
Work Time Limit
0.50
0.44
Family Cap
0.37
0.16
Lifetime Limit
2.98
1.33
Welfare Reform Score

Min
0
0
0
1

Max
1
1
1
5

The independent variables included in the logit regressions are often cited as predictors of policy outcomes in welfare
policy research. Table 2 provides summary statistics for independent variables.
Table 2: Summary Statistics (N = 50)
Mean
Independent Variables
22.58
Percent Female Legislators
12.09
Poverty Rate
4.87
Unemployment Rate
10.33
Percent Black
98.12
TTR Per Capita Index
52.92
Percent Democrat Legislators
0.34
Individualistic
0.32
Traditionalistic

Std. Dev.
7.33
3.01
1.06
9.69
18.71
14.76
0.48
0.47

Min
8.8
5.6
2.7
3.7
66.9
23.6
0
0

Max
34
20.1
7.8
36.8
162.3
86.6
1
1

The independent variables used are: Percent Female
Legislators 2005, Poverty Rate 2005, Unemployment Rate 2005,
Percent Black 2005, Total Taxable Resourses (TTR) Per Capita
Index 2005, Percent Democrat Legislators 2005, Individualistic
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Political Culture, and Traditionalistic Political Culture. The independent variable of interest in my analyses is the percentage of female legislators in each state legislature for the year
2005 (Percent Female Legislators: 2005). Values for this variable were acquired from the Women's Legislative Network
of National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL). Figure 1
reports the percentage of female legislators in each state legislature. As indicated earlier, I predict that states with higher
percentages of female legislators will be less likely to adopt
welfare sanctions than will states with lower percentages of
female legislators. In other words, as the percentage of female
legislators increases, the probability of welfare sanctions being
adopted will decrease and welfare policy environments will
improve; these coefficients are hypothesized to be positive in
the three logit regressions and positive in the ordinal logit regression as well.
Figure 1. Percentage of Female Legistators
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The next three independent variables in the model specifications are intended to measure population parameter influences on welfare sanction policies and overall welfare
policy environments. These include "Poverty Rate: 2005,"
"Unemployment Rate: 2005," and "Percent Black: 2005."
Values for these variables were provided by the U.S. Census. I
predict that states with higher poverty rates will be more likely
to adopt welfare sanctions and the welfare policy environment
will decline. This need not be seen as punishment but, instead,
as a means of getting the unemployed employed-research
has shown that poverty rates decline as unemployment rates
decline (Blank, 1997, 2002; Hoynes & MaCurdy, 1994).
Much of the same logic behind poverty rate influence on
welfare policies is found in unemployment rate influence on
welfare policies. In an attempt to move welfare recipients back
into the workforce, I predict that states with higher unemployment rates will be more likely to adopt welfare sanctions and
the welfare policy environment will decline.
Finally, Fording (2003) argues that there is a racial component to welfare reform. Given Fording's argument, I predict
that states with higher percentages of Blacks will be more
likely to adopt welfare sanctions and the welfare policy environment will decline.
Next I added a measure of state economies. As would be
expected, there is a wealth of literature pertaining to state
economics and levels of welfare support/reform (Blank,
1997; Garfinkel, Rainwater, & Smeeding, 2004; Moller, Huber,
Stephens, Bradley, & Nielsen, 2003; Rainwater & Smeeding,
2003). While there are several state economic variables that
could be included in these models, economic measures, when
grouped in one model, generally suffer from high degrees
of multicollinearity. To avoid this problem, I settled on one
measure of state economics-"Total Taxable Resources Per
Capita Index: 2005." TTR is a detailed measure of state fiscal
capacities comprised of several state economic indicators (e.g.,
gross state product, federal indirect business taxes, dividend
incomes, net realized capital gains, etc.). Values for TTR were
collected from the Department of Commerce. Because states
with higher TTR are better able to fund welfare programs
(Tannenwald, 1999), I hypothesize that states with higher TTR
values will be less likely to adopt welfare sanctions and welfare
policy environments will improve.
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Next I included a measure representing the percentage of
Democrats in each state legislature. Here again there is a wealth
of literature pertaining to party balance and levels of welfare
support/reform (Brown, 1995; Fellowes & Rowe, 2004; Hero
& Preuhs, 2007; Holbrook & Van Dunk, 1993; Keiser, Mueser,
& Choi, 2004; Smith, 1997). Where party balance and welfare
support/reform is concerned, the consensus of research finds
that Democrats are more supportive of welfare policies. This
variable, "Percent Democrat Legislators: 2005," is simply
the percentage of each legislature comprised of Democrats.
Values for this variable were collected from the NCSL. Because
Democrats are generally perceived to be more favorable to the
plight of the poor, I predict that states with higher percentages
of Democratic legislators will be less likely to adopt welfare
sanctions and welfare policy environments will improve.
Last, Iinclude an independent variable that taps measures of
state political culture."State Political Culture" utilizes Elazar's
(1970) state political culture classifications of moralistic, individualistic, or traditionalistic. States with a moralistic political
culture view the overall society as more important than the
individual; states with an individualistic political culture limit
community/government intervention into private activities;
and states with a traditionalistic political culture limit government to securing the existing social order. Obviously, some
states encompass aspects of more than one political culture.
For my research, states are classified by the dominant political culture as identified by Elazar. Because multinomial variables cannot be used as independent variables in regression
analysis, two dummy variables were created with moralistic
state political cultures as the reference category (coded as zero
in both variables) and individualist and traditionalistic political cultures were coded as one in alternate variables. Given this
coding, I predict that states with individualistic and traditionalistic political cultures will be more likely to adopt welfare
sanctions and welfare policy environments will decline.
Results
The logit regressions on the dichotomous dependent policy
sanction variables produced interesting, albeit somewhat
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tempered, results. As can be seen in Table 3, several of the coefficients are in the predicted directions, with some notable exceptions. When interpreting logit coefficients it is important
to remember how the dependent variables were coded-zero
represents sanction policy not being adopted; positive coefficients indicate that sanction policies are more likely to be
adopted.
Foremost among the notable exceptions is the percent
female legislators coefficient for the family cap and lifetime
limit sanctions; they are positive instead of the predicted negative. This indicates that increasing levels of female legislators
increases the probability of stiffer family cap and lifetime limit
sanctions. These results could indicate that female legislators
do not want to reward reckless behavior (having more children while on welfare) and that 60 months is too long a period
for individuals to receive welfare benefits. Where work time
limits are concerned, the coefficient for level of female legislators is negative as expected. This finding is intuitive, as female
legislators may better understand the difficulties of working
mothers. Equally surprising, poverty rate is negative in the
family cap and lifetime limit models, meaning that as poverty
rates increase, harsher sanctions are less likely. This may indicate that states react to the needs of citizens instead of welfare
politics. Unemployment rates produced interesting results for
two of three sanction policies as well. However, it is in the predicted direction for work time limits, which is the only sanction policy of the three directly related to getting welfare recipients back to work. Family caps and lifetime limits may be
seen as punishments unrelated to unemployment levels and
therefore may not be affected by unemployment rates.
Percent Black was in the predicted direction across all
three sanction policies and, in the family cap model, the coefficient was significant (at the .05 level). These results indicate
that levels of state Black populations are good predictors of
sanction policies, especially where family caps are concerned.
Further, that the family cap coefficient was significant for
percent Black may reflect a racial component to welfare policy.
TTR levels were as predicted in two of three models (work
time and lifetime limits). The negative work and lifetime limit
coefficients may reflect an ability to fund TANF for the entire
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24 and 60 months and the positive family cap coefficients may
reflect an unwillingness to sanction certain behaviors, regardless of revenue. Finally, the percent Democratic legislators coefficients were in the predicted direction in two of the three
specifications-family cap and lifetime limits. That the work
time limit coefficient was positive is interesting and may reflect
that Democratic legislators do not want to be seen as sanctioning a policy that rewards welfare recipients for not taking steps
to move from welfare to work.
Table 3: Logit Models of Welfare Sanction Policies
Dependent Variables
Work
Family
Lifetime
Time
Independent Variables
Cap
Limit
Limit
0.058
0.046
-0.025
Percent Female Legislators
(0.072)
(0.061)
(0.058)
0.005
-0.042
-0.058
Percent Democrat Legislators
(0.024)
(0.025)
(0.035)
-0.023
0.010
-0.005
TTR Per Capita Index
(0.023)
(0.028)
(0.031)
0.095
-0.197
-0.212
Unemployment Rate
(0.378)
(0.415)
(0.602)
0.034
0.121*
0.069
Percent Black
Poverty Rate
Individualistic
Traditionalistic
Constant
Psuedo r 2
Log Likelihood
N

(0.046)

(0.056)

(0.063)

0.118
(0.201)
2.311*
(1.102)
11.098
(1.266)
-0.193
(3.947)
0.19
-27.98
50

-0.336
(0.218)
0.868
(1.042)
2.221
(1.452)
2.683
(4.043)
0.24
-25.95
50

-0.251
(0.264)
0.546
(1.368)
1.227
(1.771)
3.025
(4.742)
0.17
-18.35
50

Note: standard errors in parenthesis. *p <.05
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The state political culture variables produced predicted
results. Both coefficients were positive and the individualistic
coefficient in the work time limit model was significant (at the
.05 level). Given that individualist state political cultures place
the needs of the individual over those of the society, this result
is not surprising.
Next I calculated predicted probabilities of sanction policies being adopted depending on the percentage of female
legislators in state legislatures (Spost, developed by Long and
Freese, was used to generate predicted probabilities). To do so,
I varied the percentage of female legislators from its minimum
value (8.8) to its maximum value (34), while holding all other
variables at their mean value. The difference between the
minimum and maximum value (subtracting the minimum
value from the maximum value) is representative of the
"change" in probability of sanctions being adopted. Positive
change indicates an increased probability of sanctions being
adopted, while negative change indicates a decreased probability of sanctions being adopted.
Table 4: Predicted Probabilities of Welfare Sanction Policies
Min
Max
Change
Work Time Limit Sanction*
42%
57%
15%
Family Cap Sanction*
57%
29%
-28%
Lifetime Limit Sanction
20%
6%
-14%
Note: *p < .05

The predicted probabilities displayed in Table 4 shed light
on the affect of percent of female legislators on the probability
of sanction policies being adopted. Two sanction policy performed as hypothesized-family cap and lifetime limit. Where
the family cap and lifetime limit policies are concerned, varying
the percent female legislator variable from its minimum to its
maximum value generated predicted negative probabilities.
Predicted probabilities for family cap sanctions indicate a 28
percent decreased probability of family cap sanctions being
adopted as the percent of female legislators increases; this difference is statistically significant (at the .05 level). Predicted
probabilities for lifetime limit sanctions indicate a 14 percent
decreased probability of lifetime limit sanctions being adopted
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as the percent of female state legislators increases. Where work
time limits are concerned, when the number of female state
legislators is at its minimum value, there is a 42 percent predicted probability of work time limit sanctions being adopted.
Conversely, when female state legislators is at its maximum
value, there is a 57 percent predicted probability of work time
limit sanctions being adopted. More directly, varying the percentage of female state legislators from its minimum (8.8) to
its maximum (34) value results in a 15 percent increase in the
probability that work time limit sanctions will not be adopted,
and the difference is significant (at the .05 level).
I next ran an ordinal logit regression on the welfare reform
score dependent variable (see Table 5). When interpreting the
coefficients in Table 5 it is important to remember how the
dependent variable was coded. The dependent variable was
coded from one to five with one representing minimal welfare
policies and five representing integrated welfare policies; two
represents limited welfare policies, three represents conservative welfare policies, and four represents generous welfare policies. Given this coding, the percent female legislators is in the
predicted direction. Additionally, percent Democratic legislators, poverty rate, individualistic and traditionalistic state political cultures are all in the predicted direction. Unemployment
rate was predicted to be negative but is positive and TTR was
predicted to be positive but is negative. Most surprising is
that percent Black, which was predicted to be negative, was
positive.
These results indicate that the percentage of female legislators does have a positive effect on the overall welfare environments in states. While one of the individual sanction policies
(work time limit) presented in the logit models did not yield
predicted results, the percent female legislators in a given
state may play a more important role in the formulation of
overall welfare policy, which then creates a friendlier welfare
environment.
Predicted probabilities were run on the welfare reform
score dependent variable as well. Here again, percent female
legislators was varied from its minimum to its maximum
values while holding all other variables at their mean values.
This process created five predicted probabilities for the
welfare reform score dependent variable. Each set of predicted
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probabilities provides percentages for each category within
the ordinal dependent variables.
Table 5: Ordinal Logit Welfare Reform Score Model

3

Sig
0.33
0.08
0.81
0.59
0.46
0.02
0.24
0.98

Percent Female Legislators
Percent Democrat Legislators
TTR Per Capita Index
Unemployment Rate
Percent Black
Poverty Rate
Individualistic
Traditionalistic

0.048
0.037
-0.005
0.178
0.031
-0.429
-1.049
-19.624

S.E.
0.048
0.021
0.025
0.335
0.043
0.179
0.901
1445.976

Cut Point 1

-22.055

1445.981

--

Cut Point 2

-4.435

3.478

--

Cut Point 3

-2.114

3.469

--

Cut Point 4

-0.213

3.506

--

Pseudo r = 0.41
2

Log Likelihood

=

-46.94

N = 50

Predicted probabilities for welfare reform showed minimal
changes in all five categories. While the predicted probability
changes were minimal, they were in the expected direction.
Changes for the minimal and limited categories were negative,
while changes in the conservative, generous, and integrated
categories were positive. These changes indicate that as the
percentage of female legislators increased, so did the probability of a state having an overall friendlier welfare environment.
Conclusion
My research findings are in line with the literature regarding the effect of female legislators on policy outcomes, which is
to say "it depends" or "sometimes." More specifically, the effectiveness of female legislators in state legislatures is tempered
or enhanced by other factors. Do female legislators, a minority
in every state, go along for the sake of getting along? Meaning,
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do female legislators, upon entering the "good ol' boy" world
of politics, consciously or subconsciously decide not to rock
the political boat by not addressing issues of concern to them
or by adopting more male-oriented policy issues? This is more
likely to occur in legislatures with small minorities of female
legislators. When the numbers of female legislators increase,
there can be a "tipping" effect whereby they are emboldened
by their numbers and become more effective at addressing
issues that concern them.
There are, of course, institutional factors that affect whether
females are elected as legislators and, once elected, that affect
female legislator effectiveness as well. Nominating/primary
processes can favor male candidates and leadership positions
can be difficult for females to secure.
Where specifics are concerned, one possible explanation
for the counterintuitive results regarding percent female state
legislators on work time limit sanctions may be found in the
state political culture; that is, state political culture may be the
driving force behind policies adopted in individual states. This
argument implies that elected officials act in accordance with
the political culture of their states regardless of their gender
or party affiliation. Compare, for example, Democrats in Texas
with Democrats in Massachusetts. Texas Democrats are likely
to be more conservative than Massachusetts Democrats. These
characteristics are likely to transcend gender. Therefore, even
if it is assumed that female Democrats in Texas are more liberal
on certain issues than are male Democrats in Texas, they are not
likely to be as liberal on these issues as are female Democrats
in Massachusetts. If these assumptions are accepted, then
sanction policy outcomes in particular states, regardless of the
percent of female legislators, are the product of the state political culture. Of course, other factors (party composition, TTR,
race, poverty, etc.) can and do influence policy outcomes, but
these factors may, in part, be the product of state political cultures as well.'
One last point is worth restating. The model presented in
Table 5 performed quite well yielding hypothesized directions
on all but three variables. This model utilized the Meyers et al.
(2002) measure of welfare reform, which is a cumulative policy
variable. As previously stated, these results indicate that the
percent female legislators can have a positive effect on the
overall welfare environments. This implies that percent female
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legislators does matter on a realm of policies (cash assistance,
food assistance, disability assistance, tax policy, and unemployment compensation in each state), the cumulative effect
of which is better or worse welfare environments. Therefore,
even if the level of female legislators does not result in predicted policy outcomes on one of the three sanction policies (work
time limits), it does appear to matter on welfare environments.
In the end, these policies may matter more to welfare recipients than whether specific sanctions are adopted.
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Endnotes:
1. The logit and ordered logit models presented were run without
measures of state political culture included and the results were
strikingly different. Most notable, the coefficient signs for percent
female and black legislators were opposite of the directions for
the models that included these measures. This is evidence of the
affect that political culture plays in the policy adoption in state
legislatures.

